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A Rapid Appraisal of the Implementation of  
the 2005 Direct Cash Transfer Program in Indonesia:  
A Case Study in Five Kabupaten/Kota 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This report is the result of a rapid assessment of the first phase of the direct cash 
transfer program that is one part of the fuel subsidy reduction compensation program 
that is provided to poor households. The early observation and assessment of the 
administration of this program was needed in order to know the level of achievement 
of the program and its problems so it can be used as the basis for improving its 
administration and for planning programs of this type in the future. This assessment 
was undertaken using a qualitative methodology through in-depth interviews with a 
number of respondents and the quantitative analysis of secondary data. The 
investigation results show that time contraints for every phase of the direct cash 
transfer program, starting from the targeting process, socialization, card distribution, 
funds allocation to the handling of problems made the implementation appear 
”rushed” and its hastiness had an impact on the success of each phase of the 
implementation. The socialization program is the phase that was assessed as the 
weakest because it was not done intensively, especially in connection with institutions 
at the local level that had not yet been formed. In general, other phases of the program 
implementation proceeded well, although mistargeting triggered the emergence of 
conflict as the result of social jealousy. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The rise in the price of fuel oil (BBM) on 1 October 2005 added to the financial 
burden on the lives of the community. To ease this burden, the government 
implemented the Direct Cash Transfer (SLT1) for poor households that were identified 
by Statistics Indonesia (BPS) through the use of proxy-means testing methodology. 
Every household receives Rp100,000 per month that is provided once each quarter. For 
the first phase of the distribution that was realized on 1 October 2005, the government 
made Rp4.6 trillion available for approximately 15.5 million households. The 
distribution of funds was undertaken by PT Pos Indonesia through its branch offices.  
 
This report was written on the basis of the results of SMERU’s rapid appraisal of the 
implementation of SLT between 22 November-3 December 2005 in five kabupaten/kota. 
This appraisal was intended to obtain an actual picture of the first phase of the SLT 
implementation as lessons for improvements in distribution in future phases. 
 
This study used a qualitative approach by conducting in-depth interviews with 93 
recipient households, 30 non-recipient households and a number of key informants at 
various levels of government. In addition, five Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were 
conducted with kabupaten/kota authorities/figures, 10 with village authorities/figures 
and 12 with household recipients. The analysis used is qualitative analysis 
supplemented with a quantitative analysis of the targeting data.  
 
The research results show that the limited time available made the SLT implementation 
seem “rushed” and, in turn, impact on the success of the implementation of each phase 
and the whole program. 
 
This study found mistargeting although the incidence was relatively low as indicated 
by the number of non-poor households that became SLT recipients (leakage) and the 
number of poor households that have not yet received payments (undercoverage). 
 
Several factors are believed to be behind the mistargeting: 1) the disparity in the 
capacities of the enumerators as they were not supported by adequate training and 
guidance; 2) the rather high level of subjectivity of the enumerators and local area unit 
(SLS) heads; 3) the screening procedure for poor households was not done carefully; 4) 
enumerators did not always come to the households that were being assessed; 5) 
indications of the existence of a quota for target households down to the RT level; 6) 
poverty indicators that were not sensitive enough to capture the whole socio-economic 
condition of households; 7) an incomplete choice of answers; and 8) the concept of 
the household and family as the SLT recipient unit was not clearly determined.  
 
The quantitative analysis shows that: 1) the district targeting allocations were quite 
good (65.8%), meaning kecamatan that have more poor people received more KKB 
cards; 2) targeting at the household level shows varying results; 3) checking of the 
completion of household respondent forms shows a high level of consistency (78.3%) 
but there are inter-variable and inter-district variations; 4) a simulation of the results 
                                                 
1SLT: Subsidi Langsung Tunai: Direct Cash Transfer. 
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of the data collection on respondents shows that the cut-off point of 0.2 that is used by 
BPS to determine the target is too low with the result that households that are 
unsuitable can become recipients; and 5) there were indications that supplementary 
household registration was less selective.  
 
Household SLT recipients were given an identity card in the form of a BBM 
Compensation Card (KKB). The delivery of KKBs to recipient households varied 
between districts. Some were delivered by BPS officials, some also via the local 
government or enumerators. The means of delivery also varied, some were done from 
house to house, some also collectively by gathering recipients at a certain location. 
 
The problems that emerged in the distribution of KKB included: 1) inconsistency 
between the identity of the recipient with the data included on the KKB; 2) cases of 
delays in the distribution of KKB at the request of the community; 3) cases of levies for 
transport costs by officials distributing cards to recipients; 4) several KKB cards that 
were cancelled/confiscated not yet delivered to BPS; and 5) information on cancelled 
KKB cards not always being known by the post office.  
 
Several impediments were found in the distribution of SLT funds, including: 1) the 
minimal number of officials in each post office; 2) recipients who live far-away have to 
pay for the cost of transport which is quite difficult for them; 3) the tendency for 
recipients to collect the funds on the first day of distribution resulted in long queues; 
and 4) the lack of clarity on operational funds became the reason for not undertaking 
mobile services or the provision of additional service posts in several regions. 
 
The appointment of PT Pos Indonesia as the distribution agent for SLT funds was 
assessed as appropriate by many because of their broad experience in servicing 
community funds transfers, their offices are located in most kecamatan, and considered 
relatively free of corruption. In several regions whose distribution process ran 
smoothly, the post office did the following: 1) determined the schedule of distribution 
that was well publicized; 2) coordinated with local authorities; and 3) added posts or 
payment counters, or became more pro-active for districts that are relatively far away. 
 
In general, recipients collected the SLT funds directly, with the exception of the 
elderly and the sick. Most recipients collected the funds by presenting only the KKB. 
Some districts also required the presentation of identification cards (KTP) that 
recipients did not always have. This condition was exploited by some village 
authorities to demand payment for preparing more expensive identification. 
 
Recipients obtained the full amount of Rp300,000 in funds from the post office. Levies 
were applied at the community level, both voluntary and not, including for village 
authorities, enumerators, RT heads or other poor households who were not SLT 
recipients. In general, recipients used the funds for consumption needs, with only a 
small part used to pay off debt, the cost of medical treatment, schoolchildren’s needs, 
additional capital or saved. 
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The emergence of various problems of targeting and distribution was associated with 
the weakness of the socialization program. This deficiency occurred at all stages of the 
implementation, starting from the data collection to the complaint mechanism. It 
could be said that the socialization to the communities essentially did not take place. 
Meanwhile, although the socialization for a series of local government authorities was 
undertaken, it was rather late and the information was only on the data collection 
plan. This was made worse by the unavailability of comprehensive program operational 
guidelines at the local government level. In fact, several documents from the central 
government that are related to SLT program and that could actually provide the legal 
basis for local government (such as Inpres, SK Menko Kesra and SK Mendagri) were 
late in arriving or, in fact, were not received at all. 
 
The minimal socialization during the data collection phase could have reduced the 
appearance of the moral hazard in determining the target. Nevertheless, the lack of a 
comprehensive socialization effort gave rise to misperceptions and social jealousy. 
 
Institutionally, in the region no-one felt responsible for conducting the socialization 
program. Meanwhile, the Minister for Communications and Information, as the party 
responsible for national socialization, only conducted this through the print and 
electronic media which could only be accessed by certain groups. The dissemination of 
brochures on the criteria for poor households, apart from arriving late (21 November 
2005), was limited and less than informative for the general community. 
 
In addition, institutions that handle complaints and program monitoring were also not 
operating in all districts, although the ministerial decrees of the Minister for Home 
Affairs (No. 541/2475/SJ) and the Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare (No. 
B.244/Menko/Kesra/IX/2005) for complaints and monitoring were found. SLT poskos 
were only found in Demak and Ternate and that was also only at the kabupaten/kota 
level. Information on the existence of poskos and the available complaint mechanism 
was also not widely disseminated to the community so there were variations in the 
complaints channel. 
 
Mistargeting that was worsened by an inadequate socialization program, especially on 
the target criteria and program objectives, triggered the emergence of community 
dissatisfaction. Community dissatisfaction was expressed in various forms, starting from 
complaints, protests or demonstrations, making threats to vandalism. Complaints in 
the form of protest actions and threats were usually handled by the village head 
assisted by security/police authorities. In several regions, the kabupaten/kota and 
kecamatan authorities as well as BPS also intervened. Protest actions and threats can be 
stifled by: 1) the opening of supplementary registrations for those who felt they had an 
entitlement; 2) the willingness of SLT recipients to share some of the funds with other 
poor households; and 3) officials who promise that supplementary registrations will 
receive the SLT in the following phase. 
 
In general, the coordination and communication on the implementation of the SLT 
was considered weak. This was indicated from: 1) documents from the central 
government on the SLT were late or, in fact, were not received by the local 
government; 2) data collection on poor households was conducted before Inpres No. 12 
of 2005 was issued; 3) the coordinating meeting at the ministerial level within the 
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Coordinating Ministry of People’s Welfare (16 September 2005) imprecisely 
interpreted this Inpres, namely the duty of the Ministry of Home Affairs which was 
initially as the coordinator of implementation and supervision but was later shifted 
into supervision and complaint handling. For that reason, one of the functions of the 
local government as the instrument of the Ministry of Home Affairs to coordinate the 
SLT implementation was not carried out and local government felt they were not 
officially involved in the implementation of the SLT program. The local government 
also questioned the commitment of central government to the implementation of 
political decentralization and regional autonomy because the SLT is centralized and 
implemented by institutions that are also centralized (BPS and PT Pos Indonesia).  
 
The non-transparent nature of the data collection process and the determination of 
SLT recipients were felt to be in contradiction with the democratization process that is 
still underway. In this regard, there was a conflict between the law that prevents BPS 
from publicizing respondents’ identities (Law No. 16 of 1997 on statistics) with the 
democratic need to consult with the local public on intended SLT recipients. When 
the results of the data collection on poor households gave rise to socio-political unrest, 
the central government seriously asked local governments to take “security” steps, 
including through the formation of complaints poskos. In this regard, local government 
was put in the position of being a trouble-shooter. 
 
The limited bureaucracy of the administration of the SLT Program, which was 
entrusted entirely to BPS and the post office, was the key to the program’s efficiency. 
The problem that then arose was more the result of these two program implementers 
being agencies whose employees normally work by applying a technical approach, 
while poverty is a problem that contains social, economic, and political dimensions 
and requires a comprehensive approach. 
 
The FGD results show that the level of recipient satisfaction with the implementation 
of the SLT was, in general, highest compared to the satisfaction level of village and 
kabupaten/kota authorities/figures. This is understandable because recipients are the 
group that benefits from the program. Both recipients as well as authorities at the 
village and kabupaten/kota level assessed the socialization to be the least satisfying 
aspect. Meanwhile, the method of funding disbursement and distribution of KKB cards 
was the most satisfying aspect. The results of in-depth interviews of non-recipient 
households also show a level of satisfaction that is not very different.  
 
There were differences in the evaluation of the SLT as a program. Some authorities were 
in less agreement because they considered it to be a “program that only provided a fish 
rather than a fishhook”. Some other authorities agree as long as there is no mistargetting in 
its implementation. Meanwhile the recipient community feels assisted by the SLT and 
they believe the program does not negatively impact their work ethic.  
 
Against the background of these findings, the following are several policy suggestions 
for the conduct of funding disbursement in the following stages: 
 
1. BPS and the post office continue as the main SLT managers in the field. It is 
suggested that these two institutions, in addition to being responsible to their 
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superior agencies, also have responsibility or report their activities to the 
bupati/mayor in each of their working districts.  
2. The Ministry of Home Affairs needs to assign kabupaten/kota governments to 
coordinate all administration and supervision activities for the SLT in accordance with 
Inpres No.12 of 2005. In undertaking this duty, the local government should 
immediately establish an integrated posko at all levels of government (kabupaten/kota, 
kecamatan and village) that involves BPS, the post office and the police.  
3. The duty of local government should be implemented within the framework of the 
routine activities of regional government administration. The operational costs of 
implementation should be borne by the APBD, especially for poor regions which 
should be provided via special allocation funds (DAK). 
4. It should be clearly determined whether the concept of poor family or poor 
household will be used. At the least, in the same district, a uniform concept should 
be used.  
5. KKB cards for households that are not suitable recipients have to be immediately 
cancelled by the posko. For households that refuse their cancellation, their funds 
can be blocked by the post office.  
6. Cancelled KKB cards should be immediately delivered to the kabupaten/kota BPS 
and the post office should be informed in order to avoid funding misuse by people 
who have no entitlement. 
7. The posko should immediately undertake verification and research of 
supplementary household recipients. The verification and research should be done 
from house to house. If there is insufficient time, this can be done via a community 
consultation (musyawarah) at the village level. 
8. The distribution of KKB cards to supplementary household recipients by the posko 
has to be in accordance with the KKB distribution guidelines from BPS. 
9. The names of SLT household recipients, including the results of the supplementary 
data collection, need to be published in public places at the SLS level. In the 
matter of validating the accuracy of targeting, the community should be given the 
opportunity to submit their objections to the closest posko within a certain 
timeframe. 
10. To improve the system of coordination and communication, the central 
government has to ensure that all documents that it issues are received by each 
kabupaten/kota government administration. 
11. The central government has to support the implementation of program 
socialization for the community using various channels, namely regional 
government, various print and electronic media, the distribution and widespread 
circulation of more informative and communicative brochures. The socialization 
material should especially emphasize the program aims, criteria for program 
recipients, and the availability and function of coordinating posts.  
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12. The post office needs to prepare a complete and clear schedule for the funding 
allocation for each village as well as broadly disseminate the information.  
13. The post office needs to be flexible in distributing the funds, for example by 
providing mobile posts or opening service posts at the village level. 
14. Consideration needs to be given to the requirement for identification such as a 
KTP when funds are dispersed with the aim of minimizing funding digressions. This 
needs to be supported by a policy on the production of identity cards (KTP) that is 
easy, cheap or free.  
15. There needs to be clear law enforcement of every form of program violation, such 
as the falsification of information and levies on recipients. The issuing of sanctions 
and their notification will have the effect of dissuading the community and other 
authorities from commiting such violations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In the context of reducing the oil (BBM) subsidy, on 1 October 2005, the Government 
of Indonesia increased the price of BBM. The level of this increase was high compared 
with previous price increases, on the order of 87.5% for petrol, 104.8% for diesel and 
185.7% for kerosene. This decision was based on the following conditions: 1) a sharp 
jump in the world price of oil, resulting in increasingly large provisions of subsidy funds 
that were having an increasing burden on the budget, 2) subsidies have, until now, 
tended to favor the middle and upper class of society (particularly on kerosene, see, for 
example, Sumarto and Suryahadi, 2001); and 3) the large price difference between the 
domestic and international price triggered the smuggling of oil out of Indonesia.  
 
The BBM price rise added more burden to people’s lives. They not only face the price 
rise for BBM, but also a sequence of rises in various goods and services that followed. 
The price rise had a direct impact on the declining purchasing power of most of the 
community, especially poor households. To ease this burden, the government issued 
Inpres No. 12 of 2005 on the implementation of Direct Cash Transfer (SLT)2 to poor 
households. A poor household is defined as a household that has a per capita monthly 
income of Rp175,000 or less. They are identified by BPS by using a proxy-means 
testing methodology. 
 
This assistance program was planned within the framework of compensation for 
reduced BBM subsidies. For this purpose, the government set aside compensation funds 
for approximately 15.5 million poor households/families. Each poor household/family 
received Rp100,000/month provided quarterly. For the first phase of the SLT 
disbursement that was conducted on 1 October 2005, the government set aside 
funding of Rp4.6trillion. The disbursement of SLT funds to poor households/families 
was undertaken by PT Pos Indonesia through their branches across Indonesia. 
 
Learning from past experience, the disbursement of BBM subsidy compensation funds 
always faces a variety of problems. Moreover, the SLT program was set up in a short 
timeframe (approximately three months) under the pressure of continuing jumps in 
the price of BBM on the international market. For that reason, there needs to be early 
monitoring and evaluation of its implementation in order to look for a solution to 
various obstacles and technical weaknesses in the field. In that regard, the SMERU 
Research Institute with the support of World Bank funding, undertook a rapid 
appraisal of the implementation of the SLT program between 22 November and 3 
December 2005. This appraisal was conducted in five kabupaten/kota that were 
purposively selected, namely Kabupaten Cianjur (West Java), Kabupaten Demak 
(Central Java), Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah (North Sumatra), Kabupaten Bima 
(NTB), and Kota Ternate (North Maluku). 
 
                                                 
2Several documents and publications refer to it as Cash Transfer Assistance (BLT).  
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II. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
 
 
This research was intended to obtain an actual picture of the implementation of the 
first tranche of the SLT disbursement in order to draw the lessons learned that can 
serve as input for improving the disbursement in the following tranches and for 
planning similar programs in the future. This research is specifically aimed at 
ascertaining: 
 
• The determination mechanism of poor SLT recipient households that includes 
institutions involved in data collection, the criteria used, implementation of data 
collection, checking of data validity, and the influence of local figures in the 
identification of poor households. 
 
• The implementation of SLT policy that encompasses program socialization, 
distribution of KKB cards, SLT distribution mechanism, accuracy of the total 
funds received and their uses by poor households and complaint handling and 
supervision. 
 
• Preliminary indications of the impact of the program on the poverty reduction 
effort and the level of community satisfaction on the SLT program.  
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1. Rationale for Selecting Research Sample Location 
 
The smoothness of the implementation of the first tranche of SLT disbursement in 
various districts in Indonesia varies. Based on information from various mass media 
outlets and BPS internal reports, districts were found that are relatively problem-free 
or conducive, and vice versa, there are also districts that were found to be relatively 
problematic or unconducive in resepct to the amount of social disturbance, protest 
actions, and anarchistic actions from some in the community against the 
implementation of the SLT. To capture the variation in information on the SLT 
implementation, SMERU visited five kabupaten/kota that are representative of these 
two conditions, as well as covering a number of dispersed locations, providing SMERU 
a research area that can generate baseline data on poor households as a standard for 
comparison. Kota Ternate, Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah, and Kabupaten Cianjur were 
chosen because they are categorized as conducive districts. Meanwhile Kabupaten 
Bima and Kabupaten Demak were chosen because they include districts that are not 
conducive. 
 
Whether a kabupaten/kota is conducive or not does not always reflect the same 
condition in the whole area of this kabupaten/kota. In kabupaten/kota that were 
evaluated as conducive, there were still parts that were not conducive and vice versa. 
Because of that, in each sample kabupaten/kota, two villages were chosen that each 
represent a conducive or unconducive area. In total, there were five conducive villages 
and five that were not conducive (details can be seen in Table 3.1). From each sample 
village, two hamlets/kampung/street/RW, and two to four RT were determined on the 
basis of the number and level of concentration of SLT program recipients. 
 
Early in the determination of sample kabupaten/kota, SMERU was informed that 
Cianjur was a conducive SLT implementation area. Information on the presence of 
community disturbances was obtained in the lead-up to the field visit. However, 
because contact had already been made with various local institutions and in Cianjur 
there were areas that were still found to be conducive, Kabupaten Cianjur was still 
chosen as a sample district. The village of Cibulakan in this kabupaten was chosen as 
representative of a conducive village, and at the same time is a research site for 
SMERU’s Community Based Monitoring System (CBMS). Meanwhile, the village of 
Giri Mulya was chosen because there is a relatively high level of community 
turbulence, such as demonstrations at the village office and threats to the safety of 
village officials and enumerators. 
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Table 3.1. SMERU’s SLT Research Area 
Province Kabupaten/Kota Kecamatan Village 
North Sumatra Kab. Tapanuli Tengah Sibabangun Mombang Boru**) 
  Sorkam Pearaja*) 
West Java Kab. Cianjur Cugenang Cibulakan **) 
  Cibeber Giri Mulya*) 
Central Java Kab. Demak*) Wedung Berahan Wetan*) 
  Karang Tengah Wonoagung 
West Nusa Tenggara Kab. Bima*) Monta Simpasai*) 
  Wera Nunggi**) 
North Maluku Kota Ternate Ternate Selatan Kampung Pisang**) 
  Ternate Selatan Fitu*) 
Note: *) District that is less/not conducive. 
**) SMERU research location. 
 
 
It appears that the conflict that occurred in Kota Ternate did not have an impact on 
the implementation of the SLT program. The program ran relatively smoothly and 
only a few minor problems were found. The villages of Kampung Pisang and Fitu were 
chosen in Ternate. Although these two locations are located in the same kecamatan, 
namely South Ternate, each, in fact, represents interesting criteria. In Kampung 
Pisang, that was also a location for the SMERU study Moving out of Poverty – MOoP, 
and is located in the city center, there was concern that there could be disturbances 
because it is the urban village worst affected by the previous conflict. This was not 
proven, however, as the SLT ran safely and smoothly. Meanwhile, in Fitu, located 
relatively far from Kota Ternate, the greatest community disturbance for the size of 
Kota Ternate occurred in the form of the stoning of the village office. In addition, the 
number of supplementary registrations from this location was high compared with 
other urban sites. 
 
3.2. Number and Type of Respondents 
 
Information was collected from respondents and key informants who were involved in, 
or were interested in the implementation of the SLT, starting from the kabupaten/kota, 
kecamatan, village level, and down to the community. At the kabupaten/kota level, 
respondents visited included of BPS, post office, and local government officials 
involved in the program, such as those from the social prosperity sections, assistants or 
regional secretaries, Bappeda, BKKBN, local media and NGOs. Respondents at the 
kecamatan level were BPS officials who were statistics assistants (mantis) or 
coordinators (KSK), post office workers and the sub-district head (camat). Meanwhile, 
at the village and community level, village heads, enumerators, RW/RT/hamlet heads, 
recipient households and poor households that did not receive the SLT were met (see 
Table 3.2). 
 
There was a minimum of 18 recipient households and six non-recipient households in 
each kabupaten/kota. In total, there were 93 recipient households and 37 non-recipient 
households interviewed in the five research sites. 
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The methodology that was used in this research was a qualitative methodology that 
was complemented by a quantitative analysis of secondary data. The choice of research 
location from the kabupaten/kota level down to the village was purposively selected 
based on information from the mass media, BPS and other associated agencies. The 
choice of SLT recipient household respondents was determined randomly from a list of 
recipient households in the smallest local area units (SLS), like the RT or hamlet. 
Meanwhile, non-recipient household respondents were purposively selected based on 
information from the hamlet/RW/RT head, namely non-recipient households that re-
registered as SLT recipients or were assessed as the poorest. 
 
Data was collected in the form of primary and secondary data. Secondary data was 
collected from implementing agencies, including 1) data on the number of SLT 
recipients (Target and Realization); 2) data on the number of poor families in each 
kabupaten (BKKBN and BPS); 3) data on the number of supplementary SLT registered 
households; 4) household welfare data based on the results of SMERU’s Community-
Based Monitoring System 5) several regulations that provide the basis for the 
implementation of the program, including Inpres, decrees of the Minister for Home 
Affairs (Mendagri), Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare (Menko Kesra) and 
district heads (Bupati). Meanwhile, the primary data was obtained through in-depth 
interviews of all respondents and key informants by the use of a question manual. In 
addition, the gathering of information was also undertaken through focus group 
discussions (FGD) for community leaders/authorities at the kabupaten/kota and village 
level, as well as SLT recipient households. Each FGD had six to ten participants. 
 
Table 3.2. Type and Number of Respondents in SMERU’s SLT Study 
Level Respondent Total 
1. BPS 5 
2. Post Office 5 
3. Pemda (Social Affairs Section, 
Sekda/Asda) and/or Bappeda 
8 
4. BKKBN 5 
5. Local Media 5 
1. Kabupaten/kota 
6. NGO 5 
1. BPS/Mantis  9 
2. Post Office 7 2. Kecamatan 
3. Camat (Sub-district head) 9 
1. Village Head 10 
2. Enumerator/Assistant enumerator 15 
3. RW/Hamlet Head 11 
4. RT Head 19 
5. SLT Recipient Households 93 
3. Village 
6. Poor Non-recipient Households 37 
 
FGDs at the kabupaten level and with village figures also involved a number of 
elements. FGDs at the kabupaten/kota level were attended by representatives of BPS, 
post office, local government, Bappeda, BKKBN, local media, NGOs and higher 
education institutions. Meanwhile, the FGDs with village officials were attended by 
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village staff, RT/RW/hamlet/area heads, enumerators, religious figures and community 
figures. FGDs were conducted five times in each kabupaten/kota, once at the 
kabupaten/kota level, twice at the village level and twice at the community level. In 
total, SMERU conducted five FGDs with kabupaten/kota officials, ten FGDs with 
village authorities and 12 FGDs with SLT recipient housholds.  
 
3.3. Research Schedule 
 
In total, this research activity took two and a half months. The research preparation 
started in early November 2005, in the form of a proposal preparation, preparation of 
credentials, letter of appointment, field researcher contacts, discussion of research 
method and intensification of the material (program and research). Field work was 
conducted over ten to 12 days, between 22 November and 3 December. The main 
findings, including program recommendations, as well as the draft report were finalized 
in mid-December. The final report was completed in mid-January 2006 after being 
supplemented by input from the workshop that was held in the same month. 
 
Table 3.3. SLT Research Schedule 
Activity November 05 December 05 January 06
 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 
Preparation           
Field Study           
Data Processing           
Main Findings           
Draft Report           
Workshop           
Final Report           
 
3.4. Number and Membership of the Research Team  
 
A total of 11 SMERU researchers were directly involved in this research, consisting of 
one adviser, Dr. Sudarno Sumarto, and 10 researchers, Hastuti, Syaikhu Usman, 
Bambang Sulaksono, Nina Toyamah, Sri Budiyati, Wenefrida Dwi Widyanti, Meuthia 
Rosfadhila, Hariyanti Sadaly, Sufiet Erlita and R. Justin Sodo. The ten researchers 
were divided into five teams that each had responsibility for undertaking the research 
in one kabupaten/kota. 
 
In addition, each team was assisted by a local researcher from a list consisting of Basyri 
Nasution, Erwin Romulas, G. Kelik Agus E., Bakri, Syahbudin Hadid, and Abdul Kadir 
Kamaluddin. Because of this, one team consisted of two SMERU researchers and one 
local researcher. SMERU also included Sami Bazzi, a guest researcher to provide input 
to the field report. 
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IV. FINDINGS 
 
 
4.1. Targeting 
 
Micro poverty data was necessary for the determination of the target of an 
intervention program at the household or family level. The data collection on poor 
families/households at the national level for the targeting of SLT recipients is known 
as Socio-economic Data Collection on the Population 2005 (Pendataan Sosial Ekonomi 
Penduduk 2005: PSE05). 
 
4.1.1. Data Collection Process 
 
BPS was the institution responsible for implementing the data collection on these poor 
families/households. In each kecamatan, BPS placed a kecamatan statistics coordinator 
(KSK) who was assisted by an assistant (PKSK). Most KSK are mantis and some others 
were staff of the kabupaten/kota BPS that were appointed because not all kecamatan 
have a mantis. On the other hand, PKSK usually come from the local kecamatan staff 
who are recruited for one month by BPS, but there are also some from the staff of BPS 
itself. 
 
In the conduct of the data collection, because of the limitation of time and personnel, 
as well as referring to the documentation of Mendagri,3 BPS included the village 
administration authorities and BPS associates as enumerators (PCL). Enumerators 
worked under the coordination of KSK and PKSK. 
 
Selection and training of enumerators 
 
The selection mechanism for enumerators was given to each kabupaten/kota BPS and 
was one of the responsibilities of the KSK. In general, the KSK requested the opinion 
of the village head in determining the enumerator in their area. In the majority of 
sample regions, the recruitment process for enumerators was undertaken via 
appointment by the village head to his staff. KSK only provided criteria that the 
appointed enumerator should have experience in census taking, while education was 
not specified as a strict condition. Meanwhile, in Tapanuli Tengah and in most 
kecamatan in Demak, KSK had more of a role in determining the enumerators. With 
the facilitation of kecamatan and village officials, the KSK appointed associates of BPS 
who have had experience in data processing. In almost all the sample regions, most 
enumerators have a minimum level of education of senior high school, except in 
Cianjur where most were primary school graduates and in Tapanuli Tengah where 
most were junior high school graduates. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3Directive of the Minister for Home Affairs No. 413.3/1941/SJ on Data Collection on the Poor 
Population of Indonesia, 1 August 2005. 
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The number of enumerators per village and the scope of their responsibility varied 
between districts. In Ternate, Cianjur, and Demak, the responsibility of an enumerator 
was based on the number of the smallest SLS4 or RT, which had 3-4 RT, 7-8 RT, and 
8-9 RT respectively. Meanwhile, in Bima and Tapanuli Tengah, the number of 
enumerators was not based on SLS, and each village was handled by two enumerators.  
 
Before carrying out their duties, KSK undertook training by national instructors (BPS 
Central Office) that was conducted at the provincial level for two days. Following the 
training, the KSK became the regional instructor for providing the training to 
enumerators in their respective work areas. The training material for enumerators 
included: data collection phases, how to fill forms and questionnaires as well as 
knowledge on the standard concepts needed in the data collection exercise. 
 
The training method for enumerators varied. In Ternate, apart from the delivery of 
theoretical material, test pilot interviews were also conducted with several of the 
nearest RT heads who were invited to the training location. In Tapanuli Tengah, 
enumerators were invited into the field and given a direct picture of poor households. 
These methods provided a positive contribution to the data collection activity. 
 
In addition, in the training, enumerators were instructed on the ethics associated with 
their duties and responsibilities. In Tapanuli Tengah, it was emphasized that when 
registering poor households, any feelings of personal like or dislike for the household, 
resentment, or whether the household should or should not be registered, should be 
avoided.  In Ternate, all officials were ordered to truly conduct the data collection and 
to follow the established regulations with devoutness. These special messages also 
appear to have had a positive impact on the performance of the enumerators. 
 
The training of enumerators was, in general, conducted in 1 day. According to the 
regulation, the training of enumerators was scheduled for 1–14 August 2005. The 
training was, however, implemented in accordance with the conditions in each 
district. In Cianjur and Ternate, the training was undertaken in accordance with the 
time determined, while in other areas, it was later than scheduled, for example, in 
Kecamatan Karangtengah, Demak it was conducted between 18-19 August 2005. 
 
The conduct of the data collection 
 
Officially, BPS determined that the data collection would be conducted from 15 
August–15 September 2005. In its implementation, data collection was conducted 
after the enumerators received the training.  
 
In almost all sample kabupaten/kota, the implementation phases of the data collection 
on poor families/households did not entirely follow the flow-chart that had been 
determined for enumerators (see Figure 1). After obtaining the list of poor households 
from the SLS head, the enumerator should have used or considered the existence of 
other data sources as the reference for completing the list of poor households in the 
PSE05.LS form. Subsequently, enumerators undertook field verification to determine 
                                                 
4The smallest SLS is the basis for the working area of the data collection. The smallest SLS in most 
districts is the Rukun Tetangga (RT), while in some other districts it is the street or hamlet.   
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Figure 1: Flow Chart on the Data Collection Activity on Poor Households 
by Enumerators 
 
A. The procedure that should have been followed: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. The procedure that was generally followed: 
 
 Enumerator 
visits SLS 
head, notes 
poor 
households. 
Completion of the 
PSE05.LS form.  
Households were not 
analyzed on the basis 
of their poverty level. 
Complete 
PSE05.RT. 
Not all households 
were visited by 
enumerators. 
 
The 
enumerator 
visited the 
SLS head, 
investigated 
and noted the 
poor 
households. 
Completing the data on poor households from: 
-BKKBN data 
-Poverty census by BPS regions 
-Local government data 
Completion of the 
PSE05.LS form. 
Starting with the 
poorest 
households. 
Field verification:  
- asking neighbors and 
community figures 
- direct observation by 
enumerators 
To determine:    
- suitability, and  
- note the poor 
households overlooked. 
Interviews 
with qualified 
poor 
households 
using the 
completed 
PSEO5.RT. 
the suitability or otherwise of registered households as well as adding poor households 
that were not yet registered. Afterwards, the enumerator had to approach each poor 
household to register them in the PSE05.RT. In practice, after obtaining the list of 
poor households from the SLS head, the enumerator usually conducted the data 
collection on poor households immediately with the PSE05.RT list. 
 
Indeed, in general, the enumerators commenced the process of capturing poor 
households by asking the SLS head (RT or hamlet) to prepare a list of 
families/households believed to be poor according to the concept given during the 
training, namely those who are very much in need of assistance to fulfill their essential 
needs (food, education/schooling, and health). However, most enumerators in almost 
all sample regions did not consider the presence of other sources of data in completing 
the PSE05.LS form. 
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In the registration process for poor households using the PSE05.LS form, obstacles and 
problems, both general and case-by-case in nature, arose: 
 
- A variety of understandings on poverty. In Bima, the concept of poverty was 
classified into three categories: very poor for those who experience food problems, 
poor for those experiencing problems in accessing health services and almost poor 
for those experiencing problems in access to education. In some regions there was a 
tendency to include widows in the register of poor households although some of 
them live with their reasonably well-off children. 
 
- The smallest unit that was used as the target was still unclear, being a household or 
family. As a consequence, there were poor families who live under the responsibility 
of other families that were registered, and vice versa, there were also poor families 
who are not registered because in their household there were other poor families 
who were already registered. 
 
- The subjectivity of enumerators and SLS heads. They tended to include people 
living close to them first without considering their poverty condition. Cases like 
this were found, among other places, in Desa Berahan Wetan, Demak that was 
followed by a demand from the community for the dismissal of the enumerator from 
his job as a teacher. 
 
- The enumerators themselves made the list of households that were considered poor 
(PSE05.LS) without consulting with the SLS head (RT). Cases like this were found 
in Demak5 and Ternate, among others. In Ternate, because the enumerator failed to 
meet with the head of the RT, the PSE05.LS list was filled on the basis of the 
register of raskin (rice for the poor) recipients, in addition to information that the 
enumerator already knew. 
 
- In Tapanuli Tengah, there were enumerators who came directly to poor households 
to complete the PSE05.RT list first of all, then filled in the PSE05.LS form. 
 
- Most officials did not register households based on the order of their poverty 
condition or by, at least, grouping them as poorest, poor, and almost poor.  
 
- There were indications of a quota of registered households down to the smallest SLS 
(RT). In Demak, one KSK requested that households registered in each SLS be 
limited to no more than 30%, in Cianjur it varied between 30%-50%, while in 
Bima there was a maximum quota of 50% of all households, each SLS was only 
provided with 25 PSE05.RT forms. In Tapanuli Tengah, indications of a quota were 
seen from the number of PSE05.RT forms that were distributed. Meanwhile in 
Ternate, the SLS heads and enumerators did not feel that there was a quota because 
they could register any number of households and the additional PSE05.RT forms 
they requested were provided. 
                                                 
5It appears that the institutional structure of the RT in this district was not well-known by the 
community, as seen from the number of people who did not know the name of the head of their RT and 
did not know the specific number of the RT/RW where they lived. 
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- There were households that were not included or were deleted from the PSE05.LS 
list because there were the same registration limitations for all SLS without 
considering the proportion of poverty in each area. Because this list, in general, was 
not put together on the basis of poverty conditions and deletions tended to be done 
on the lowest sequence, there were concerns that poor households or, in fact, those 
that are very poor, were deleted. This concern was strengthened by the fact there 
were still households classified as poor but not registered. 
 
The field verification phase, especially via direct observation was not always 
undertaken by enumerators, with the exception of Ternate. The neglect of this phase 
by most enumerators appears to be not entirely their fault. When examining the 
contents of the field administration manual that became the guide for KSK/PKSK and 
enumerators, it appears that the verification stage was not included. The enumerators, 
in general, immediately undertook the census with the PSE05.RT questionnaire in 
every household in the PSE05.LS list. 
 
If the field verification or personal observation was well and correctly undertaken, 
there would certainly be a probability that several households in the PSE05.LS were 
deleted when the relevant party was deemed unsuitable as a poor household and, 
furthermore, did not need to be enumerated with the household questionnaire. The 
absence of verification is supported by data in Table 4.1 that shows that in Tapanuli 
Tengah, Cianjur, Demak, and Bima, the number of registered households was the same 
as the number of enumerated households. 
 
The difference in the number of registered households with the number of enumerated 
ones only occurred in Ternate, in the amount of 725 households. This shows that there 
were attempts by enumerators to check first, so all households that were submitted by 
the SLS head were not immediately considered suitable and enumerated. 
Table 4.1. Number of Poor Households that were Processed and Received KKB 
Cards in Sample Kabupaten/Kota 
KKB Cards Received 
Sample 
Kabupaten/Kota 
Registered 
Households 
(PSE05.LS) 
Households 
Encoded  
(PSE05.RT) Number % 
1. Tapanuli Tengah 23,627 23,627 23,538 99.6 
2. Cianjur 181,051 181,051 179,939 99.4 
3. Demak 102,804 102,804 99,217 96.5 
4. Bima 43,621 43,621 43,641 100.0 
5. Ternate*) 4,657 3,932 3,932 100.0 
Note:*) Only households listed in the Listing Census form, not including households that occupy 
special districts (LSK) such as refugees, that are not the SLT target. 
 
During the household census phase (the completion of the PSE05.RT), with the 
exception of Ternate and Tapanuli Tengah, most enumerators confess to not always 
approaching and directly interviewing registered households (PSE05.LS). The reason 
being that the enumerator already knew the household condition well or had 
information from previous data collections, such as the Voters’ Registration 
(Pendaftaran Pemilih) and the Sustainable Population Data Collection System 
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(Pendataan Penduduk Berkelanjutan: P4B) in 2003. The non-attendance of enumerators 
in every household on whom data was collected was supported by 36.6% of the 93 
household respondents who admitted that they were not approached by an 
enumerator. In addition, approximately 47.5% of the 59 households visited by 
enumerators admit that the enumerator only asked some of the questions in the 
PSE05.RT. 
 
From a procedural perspective, the non-attendance of enumerators at households that 
were enumerated was a mistake that contributed to the level of errors in data 
collection, especially those that were non-technical in nature. However, given the 
time constraint and the fact that enumerators were already well-acquainted with their 
area of operation, this appears understandable for many stakeholders, including BPS, 
and so there were no sanctions for this neglect. It also appears that BPS did not tightly 
supervise the conduct of this data collection. 
 
Completed PSE05.RT forms were collected by the KSK and submitted to the 
kabupaten/kota BPS for data entry. In several districts, some data-entry activities were 
undertaken in the provincial BPS office. The data-entry process for census results had 
already commenced when the field census activity was still ongoing. 
 
At the time of the document gathering, the KSK should have checked the completion 
of the PSE05.RT, at least for one of the first SLS. The assumption being that if the 
completion of one set of documents was correct, there was a high probability that the 
results of the completion of the ensuing documents would not be significantly 
different. However, once again because of the time constraint, according to one 
enumerator, the KSK did not conduct a check on the document contents, but only 
checked that the total number of PSE05.RT documents was consistent with the 
number of households registered in the PSE05.LS. Because of this, several mistakes 
were encountered, such as several parts of the form being skipped, inconsistency 
between the contents of the left column with the validation of the contents in the 
right column. 
 
The data entry results at the kabupaten/kota and provincial BPS were sent to the BPS 
central office for poverty score enumeration. After determining the number and name 
of poor recipient households, the data was sent to PT Pos Indonesia for the production 
of identity cards for poor households that are known as BBM compensation cards 
(Kartu Kompensasi BBM: KKB). 
 
The weakness of poverty variables 
 
Apart from the data collection procedure, the instruments or variables that were used 
to identify poor families/households also received a lot of attention. Many 
stakeholders, even in community circles, considered the variables used to determine 
the poverty criteria to be insensitive to the entire socio-economic condition of 
households. For that reason, from in-depth interviews and discussions that were 
conducted, many regret that variables such as income, house ownership as well as land 
ownership and size were not included. In addition, most of the people also hold the 
opinion that poverty is relative, meaning poverty in one district does not determine 
poverty in other districts, so local poverty variables should also be considered. 
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The choices of answers for each variable were considered to have caused confusion in 
completion. As an example, the variable on type of floor only provided two options, 
namely a low-quality dirt/bamboo/wood floor and a high-quality cement/ceramic/wooden 
floor. In reality, a lot of houses with low-quality cement floors were found, so the 
enumerator had difficulty in classifying the choice of answer. The same example is on the 
variable on type of wall. The answer for main source of lighting that only provided a 
choice between electric and non-electric lighting without differentiating whether the 
electricity meter used was the household’s own or shared (nyambung), was also considered 
less sensitive because in reality there are still many households that share electricity with a 
very limited allocation of power. 
 
4.1.2. Targeting accuracy 
 
To look at the level of accuracy of the SLT program target, a qualitative and 
quantitative approach was taken. Qualitatively, the observations of the SMERU team 
as well as answers from most respondents showed that there was a relatively low level 
of mistargeting. This is indicated from the existence of non-poor households that 
became SLT recipients (leakage) and poor households that have not yet been 
recipients (undercoverage), but the total number is not large. 
 
The quantitative approach that was conducted via a variety of analyses also showed 
the presence of mistargeting with a prevalence that varied between the various types of 
analysis. 
 
Correlation analysis: the population of the poor resulting from the BPS 2000 or 
SMERU poverty mapping with the number of KKB recipients6 
 
The correlation analysis at the kecamatan level between the poor population from the 
BPS and SMERU poverty mapping in 2000 with the number of KKB recipient 
households in the five research locations shows a level of closeness that is relatively 
high (65.8%) and significant. In each kabupaten/kota, the level of correlation varies 
with the lowest range in Cianjur (47.9%) and highest in Ternate (96.3%). Based on 
the poverty rank with the Spearman rank correlation, in most study locations there is a 
higher correlation level and a significant value, except for Kabupaten Bima (see Table 
4.2). It was found that the geographic targeting allocation of the SLT program at the 
kecamatan level was quite good, meaning the regions with a higher number of poor also 
obtained relatively more KKB cards. 
 
 
                                                 
6The number of KKB recipients that was used in the whole quantitative analysis was the phase I KKB 
recipients that have not yet been verified. In addition, the kecamatan that were used were those 
prevailing in 2000, so kecamatan that have undergone administrative separation have been re-grouped to 
be consistent with the basis of the data. 
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Table 4.2. Spearman Rank-Order Correlation and Correlation Co-efficient of the 
Poor Population at the Kecamatan Level from BPS Poverty Map 2000 with the 
Number of KKB Recipient Households 2005 
Kabupaten/Kota 
Correlation  
Co-efficient 
Spearman Rank-
Order 
Correlation 
Number of 
Observations (N) 
Tapanuli Tengah 0,9130 ** 0,9286 ** 8 
Cianjur 0,4788 * 0,5322 ** 24 
Demak 0,7649 ** 0,7253 ** 13 
Bima 0,6091  0,4333   9 
Kota Ternate 1) 0,9631  1,0000 ** 3 
Total (whole sample) 0,6577 ** 0,7108 ** 57 
Note: **) Significant at the level of 1%. 
                   *) Significant at the level of 5%.  
    1) Using the poverty rate from SMERU Poverty Map because it is not available  
         in the BPS Poverty Map. 
 
Benefit incidence analysis: the Demak case 
 
The targeting accuracy at the household level shows varying results, even within the 
same kabupaten/kota. As an illustration, a simple benefit incidence analysis was 
undertaken by using as a data base the results of the CBMS7 research that was 
undertaken by SMERU with data on KKB recipients for the villages of Jungpasir and 
Kedondong, Demak. 
 
From Table 4.3, part a, it can be seen that the ‘poor’ and ‘almost poor’ groups (Q1 and 
Q2) only received 54.7% of all KKB cards received by Desa Jungpasir. This means a 
mistargeting rate of approximately 45.3%. This table also shows the existence of 
undercoverage because only 48.4% of poor households (Q1) and 42.9% of the ‘almost 
poor’ (Q2) in this district received KKB cards. 
 
At the same time, Table 4.3, part b, provides an illustration of the distribution of KKB 
cards for Kelurahan Kedondong with a better level of targeting accuracy than in the 
Desa Jungpasir. The ‘poor’ and ‘almost poor’ groups (Q1 and Q2) received around 
65.6% of all KKB cards for this village. This means that a mistargeting rate of around 
34.4% was found. From the perspective of coverage, there were suitable households 
found that were not included because only 74.6% of ‘poor’ households (Q1) received 
KKB cards and 45% of ‘almost poor’ (Q2). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7The data collection on all families in the sample village (census methodology) by using 63 variables 
(demography, education, employment, health, food security, assets, security and political participation) 
and the weighting for each variable using the PCA (Principal Component Analysis) methodology, until 
a score is obtained for each family. The score produced is then ranked and grouped into 5 categories 
(quintile) that illustrate the level of prosperity, Q1 illustrates the lowest level of prosperity (very poor 
category). 
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Table 4.3. Simple Benefit Incidence Analysis 
a. CBMS Baseline Data with KKB Recipients of Year 2005, Desa Jungpasir, Demak 
Quintile 
Based on 
CBMS Data 
Number of KKB 
Recipients Based on 
Quintile 
% KKB Recipients to 
Total Households Based 
on Quintile 
Distribution of 
KKB Recipients 
Based on Quintile 
Q1 123 48.43 29.01 
Q2 109 42.91 25.71 
Q3 104 40.78 24.53 
Q4 67 26.38 15.80 
Q5 21 8.24 4.95 
  424 33.33 100.00 
Note: Total population = 1,272 households. Size of quintile = 254 - 255 households. 
b. CBMS Baseline Data with KKB Recipients of Year 2005,  
Kelurahan Kedondong, Demak 
Quintile 
Based on 
CBMS Data 
Number of KKB 
Recipients Based on 
Quintile 
% KKB Recipients to 
Total Households Based 
on Quintile 
Distribution of 
KKB Recipients 
Based on Quintile 
Q1 205 74.55 42.01 
Q2 125 44.96 25.61 
Q3 78 28.26 15.98 
Q4 59 21.30 12.09 
Q5 21 7.58 4.30 
  488 35.29 100.00 
Note: Total population = 1,383 households. Size of quintile = 275 - 278 households. 
Analysis of the conformity of the completion of PSE05.RT and the target 
determination process by BPS and SMERU 
 
In this SLT research, SMERU also repeated the data collection on 93 households by 
using the PSE05.RT questionnaire (like that conducted by BPS). This was conducted 
with the aim of looking at the consistency of the census and evaluating the target 
determination process. Although only based on a limited sample that is not sufficiently 
representative to completely evaluate the BPS data collection, the following analysis 
can provide an illustration on the implementation of the census of poor households 
with the PSE05.RT. The errors that emerged in the enumeration as well as the 
determination of the suitability or otherwise of families/households as KKB recipients 
was expected to help provide an illustration of the cause of the mistargeting. 
 
The level of uniformity of the completion of 19 variables (in the form of 14 indicators 
that were used for the determination of poor households) from 2 enumerations (BPS 
and SMERU) is presented in Table 4.4. This table shows that the level of inter-
variable and district uniformity varies, and in fact overall it is quite high at 78.3%. For 
several variables, the level of uniformity is relatively low, such as the floor area 
(40.9%), field of work (50.5%) and the number of household members (53.8%). This 
is believed to be due to different perceptions in the grouping of business fields8 by each 
                                                 
8Many notes were found in questionnaires for this question that was followed by choice of category that 
was not consistent in its contents between one and others. For example farmers, some were classified in 
rice and inter-crop production (code 1), service (code 8), or other (9). 
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official as well as the use of a concept of household and family that is not clearly 
applied. 
 
Table 4.4. Level of Uniformity of the Results of PSE05.RT (by Percentage) from 
the SMERU Research Team’s Supplementary Data Collection 
Kabupaten/Kota 
Description Tapanuli 
Tengah
Cianjur Demak Bima Ternate Total
Number of PSE05. RT Questionnaires of
BPS – SMERU 
18 20 17 18 20 93 
        
Variable:       
- Number of household members 50.0 55.0 41.2 66.7 55.0 53.8 
- Floor area 55.6 55.0 29.4 55.6 10.0 40.9 
- Broadest floor area type 50.0 95.0 82.4 100.0 50.0 75.3 
- Broadest wall area type 94.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 90.0 96.8 
- Toilet facilities 94.4 90.0 100.0 94.4 85.0 92.5 
- Source of drinking water 94.4 90.0 88.2 66.7 70.0 81.7 
- Main source of lighting 83.3 100.0 100.0 77.8 75.0 87.1 
- Type of cooking fuel 94.4 90.0 64.7 94.4 80.0 85.0 
      - Frequency of meat/chicken/milk 
purchases per week 94.4 85.0 64.7 94.4 90.0 86.0 
      - Meal frequency of usual family members 
per day 44.0 90.0 64.7 44.4 70.0 63.4 
      - Frequency of new clothes purchases by 
household members per year 38.9 90.0 47.1 77.8 65.0 64.5 
      - Access to treatment at a puskesmas or 
polyclinic for sick family members 66.7 90.0 58.8 88.9 65.0 74.2 
- Main field of work of KRT* 55.6 80.0 41.2 61.1 15.0 50.5 
- Highest level of education of KRT 61.1 95.0 70.6 83.3 85.0 79.6 
- Minimum assets of Rp500,000:       
  - Savings 94.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 65.0 91.4 
  - Gold 77.8 100.0 88.2 100.0 85.0 90.3 
  - Color TV 100.0 95.0 94.1 100.0 75.0 92.5 
  - Livestock 55.6 95.0 94.1 94.4 95.0 87.1 
  - Motor cycle 100.0 100.0 94.1 85.7 85.0 94.6 
19 variables in the form of 14 indicators 74.0 89.2 74.9 83.9 68.9 78.3 
*) KRT = kepala rumah tangga (household head). 
The results of the re-enumeration by SMERU were also used to look at the process for 
the target determination that was conducted by the central office of BPS. By using a 
different weighting system for every variable in each kabupaten/kota, a score was 
obtained for each household within the range between 0 and 1. Furthermore, for the 
determination of the suitability of households to receive the SLT, a cut-off point of 0.2 
was used for the score that was produced. This means that those that have a score of 
0.2 or above were determined to be a poor household. From this estimation, a very 
high level of accuracy was found, where 92 of the 93 sample households (98.9%), 
indeed have a score higher than 0.2. Compared with the problems or disturbances that 
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emerged, however, and observation of the socio-economic condition of the 
households, this level of targeting accuracy appears to be too high as well as not 
reflecting the reality in the field. 
 
For that, a sensitivity analysis was conducted by applying a cut-off point that varied 
from 0.3 to 0.6 to the same data. From this simulation, an estimation result was 
obtained on the level of targeting accuracy from the SLT recipient household sample 
for this study that ranged between 98.9% for the cut-off point of 0.3 up to 76.3% for 
the cut-off point of 0.6. By using the cut-off point of 0.4, several SLT recipient 
households in the first phase that were evaluated as unsuitable on the basis of direct 
field observation could be eliminated. From here it can be seen that the determination 
of the cut-off point has a very important role in the process of target determination. 
Given that the determination of the score itself is different between kabupaten/kota, 
then the determination of the cut-off point should also differ for each kabupaten/kota. 
 
Correlation analysis: the population of the poor from the results of the SMERU or BPS 
2000 poverty mapping with the number of supplementary households 
 
The emergence of the demand to undertake a supplementary collection of data for 
SLT recipients indicates that there was mistargeting. In three sample kabupaten, 
Tapanuli Tengah, Cianjur and Demak, the number of villagers who registered or asked 
to be re-processed was larger than the number of KKB recipient households in the first 
phase (see Table 4.5). The supplementary registration, in general, was already 
undertaken and was in the process of being verified by the local BPS and was expected 
to be completed by 31 December 2005. In Kota Ternate, in particular, the verification 
process was already completed. 
Table 4.5. Number of KKB Household Recipients and Supplementary 
Registrations 
Poor Households 
Kabupaten/Kota KKB Recipients 
(First Stage) 
Supplementary 
Registrations 
Tapanuli Tengah 23,538 26,199 
Cianjur 178,798 242,488 
Demak 99,217 112,314 
Bima 43,639 36,462 
Kota Ternate 3,932  1,059 * 
Note: *A total of 1,052 supplementary households have been verified and 525 
households were deemed suitable recipients of additional cards. 
Due to the large number of households that registered in the supplementary data 
collection, a correlation analysis was also conducted from the number of households in 
the first phase of SLT recipients and supplementary household registrations with the 
total number of poor from the BPS poverty map 2000, as presented in Table 4.6. The 
total correlation level between the level of poverty from the poverty mapping with the 
number of poor households from PSE05 for the five study areas in Table 4.6 is lower 
than the correlation in Table 4.2, only around 60.58%, with a pattern that varies for 
each district. It is also the same for the Spearman rank correlation, that fell from around 
71% to 69.3%. 
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Table 4.6. Spearman Rank-Order Correlation and Correlation  
Co-efficient of the Poor Population at the Kecamatan Level from BPS Poverty 
Mapping 2000 with the Number of Phase 1 SLT Recipients and Supplementary 
Registrations 2005 
Kabupaten/Kota Correlation  Co-efficient 
Spearman Rank-
Order 
Correlation 
Number of 
Observations (N) 
Tapanuli Tengah 0.7779* 0.8095 * 8 
Cianjur 0.4852* 0.5835 ** 24 
Demak 0.7085** 0.7253 ** 13 
Bima 0.5308 0.5167  9 
Kota Ternate 1) 0.9917 1.0000 ** 3 
Sample Grand Total 0.6058** 0.6931 ** 57 
Note: **) Significant at the level of 1%. 
            *) Significant at the level of 5%. 
                         1)  Uses the poverty rate from SMERU’s Poverty Map because it is not available in the BPS 
Poverty Map.  
Apart from Ternate, it was found that the supplementary household registration was 
less selective and less consistent with the allocation of the number of poor in the same 
district. The results of the field observation also show that there was a tendency for 
almost all households that were not yet registered in the first phase to be included in 
the supplementary data collection, without differentiating whether they were classified 
as suitable or unsuitable as SLT recipients. 
 
4.2. Funding Distribution 
 
4.2.1. Distribution of KKB Cards 
 
Household recipients of the SLT were given a KKB as an identity card. The KKB card 
was printed by the Post Office’s central office on the basis of data on household 
program recipients that was obtained from the BPS central office. The KKB consisted 
of four coupons as proof of the receipt of the funds at every stage of the distribution. 
 
In general, the KKB distribution mechanism from the center to the kabupaten/kota was 
conducted in accordance with procedures. The KKB was made in duplicate, with the 
original KKB received by the kabupaten/kota BPS to be given to the SLT recipients, 
while the duplicate KKB was received by the post office for the purpose of checking at 
the time of the funding disbursement. 
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Table 4.7. KKB Distribution Schedule in Sample Kabupaten/Kota, 2005 
Commencement of Distribution Sample Kabupaten/ 
Kota 
Date Received 
by BPS To Authorities To Recipients 
1. Tapanuli Tengah 5 and 8 October 10 October 10 October 
2. Cianjur 17 October  20 October  20 October  
3. Demak 8 October 9 October 10 October 
4. Bima 1 October 16 October 16 October 
5. Ternate 28 September  - 1 October  
 
BPS received the original KKB cards on large sheets only a few days before the funding 
distribution. In this limited time period, BPS had to organize a sorting process in order 
to group the KKB cards according to SLS and village, as well as checking the number 
and condition of the cards. Moreover, in several districts, BPS put the cards in a plastic 
sleeve, After this process was completed, the KKB cards were distributed to recipient 
households in a time that varied between regions as presented in Table 4.7. 
 
According to the guidelines for the KKB distribution, the kabupaten/kota BPS office 
should put together a KKB distribution team in the kabupaten/kota and kecamatan 
facilitated by the mayor/district and sub-district head, with the involvement of the 
BPS, kecamatan and village officials. In its implementation, in all research locations, 
no such distribution team was established. BPS was the main actor in the KKB 
distribution, with or without the involvement of the local government. As a result, the 
delivery of the KKB cards from the kabupaten/kota BPS office to recipient households 
varied between research locations, and, in general, can be classified into four 
distribution channels (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Flow Chart of the Distribution of KKB Cards from the Kabupaten/Kota 
BPS 
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In Cianjur, the KKB cards were delivered in the forum of a coordinating meeting at 
the kabupaten level that was attended by various agencies (local government, BRI, 
BPS, post office, police and attorney’s office) and all camat. The BPS head delivered 
the KKB cards symbolically to the district head (bupati) to be distributed to all camat. 
The next day, the camat distributed them to village heads in each kecamatan office. On 
the same or next day, the village head delivered the cards to the enumerators or RT 
heads for distribution to recipient households. 
 
In Demak and Bima, the distribution channel of the KKB cards was a little different. 
BPS delivered the KKB cards directly via the KSK to the village heads without going 
through the bupati and camat. In several kecamatan in Kabupaten Bima, community 
disturbances arose early in the process of distributing the KKB cards, resulting in BPS 
deciding to deliver the cards in stages after conditions were considered conducive or 
there was a security guarantee from the village head. In Bima, the distribution was also 
undertaken without going through the village heads, but only for a short time because 
there were indications of emerging disturbances. 
 
In Kota Ternate, BPS via the KSK delivered the KKB cards directly to recipient 
households in the company of the enumerators. Village officials were not involved at 
all, except officials who were enumerators. Meanwhile, in Tapanuli Tengah, BPS 
delivered the cards to KSK/PKSK who distributed them directly to recipients. The 
village head and street/hamlet heads only facilitated the recipient gatherings. 
 
The delivery means for the KKB cards from the distribution officials to recipient 
households also varied, even in the same districts. There were deliveries that were 
made door-to-door and some were done collectively by gathering recipients in a 
particular location. In Kabupaten Demak, Cianjur, Bima, and Tapanuli Tengah a 
combination of the two delivery methods was found. In Tapanuli Selatan, there was 
a door-to-door distribution for recipients who could not attend at the time of the 
gatherings. In Kota Ternate, almost all KKB cards were distributed from door-to-door 
by BPS staff in the company of enumerators. They were not allowed to deliver the 
KKB cards via anyone else, cards had to be received by the recipient personally. 
Cases of entrusting KKB cards to enumerators only occurred for three recipients 
because they couldn’t be found at their house even though they were visited on more 
than one occasion. 
 
In general, the delivery of the KKB cards to recipient households was carried out 
smoothly. Nevertheless, several problems were found that tended to be causal, 
including:  
 
1) Inconsistency between the identity of the recipient with the data on the KKB 
card, such as differences in name and address as well as print errors. 
 
2) In three villages in Kabupaten Bima, recipient households had not yet received 
KKB cards when the research was being conducted. This occured because of 
community pressure to delay the distribution of the cards until the supplementary 
cards arrived so the distribution of both cards could be done simultaneously. This 
was intended to avoid the emergence of protest actions and other community 
disturbances. 
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3) Certain distribution officials imposed transport levies on KKB recipients although 
the funds had already been provided by the government. In one village in 
Tapanuli Tengah, PKSK asked for “petrol money” from KKB recipients as a 
reimbursement for delivery costs. The amount of money was not fixed, some 
recipients gave Rp2,000 to Rp5,000, but some others gave no money. One hamlet 
head estimated the amount of money collected by each official as reaching up to 
Rp200,000. 
 
4) There are still KKB cards that were cancelled/confiscated by the KSK, enumerators 
or village heads that until now have not yet been returned to BPS. This was found 
in one village in Demak and Cianjur. 
 
5) Information on cancelled KKB cards was not always known to the post office 
because there was no coordination or reporting from BPS. 
 
There was concern that the last two cases above may cause losses by making the 
disbursement of funds possible to people who had no entitlement. 
 
Before or at the same time as the distribution of KKB cards, there should have been 
verification and research into the accuracy of recipient households. Households were 
assessed as suitable have the right to receive a KKB card, on the other hand households 
that were not suitable or not poor would have their cards cancelled and withheld by 
BPS. However, because of time constraints, BPS, in general, could not conduct the 
verification and research carefully. It was only done in a limited way and scope as well 
as varying between districts. 
 
In Cianjur, KSK conducted a limited verification and research at the same time as the 
KKB cards were sorted for recipients that were well-known to them. In one village in 
Demak and in several villages in Bima there was an initiative by village officials and 
enumerators to conduct the verification and cancel the KKB cards of recipients who 
were deemed unsuitable. In Ternate, the verification was undertaken at the same time 
as the distribution of the KKB cards because the cards were distributed directly by BPS 
officials from door-to-door. In the regions that conducted verifications relatively well, 
there was a tendency for the SLT distribution process to work more conducively or 
with relatively few community protests. 
 
The conduct of this limited verification produced a number of KKB cards that were 
cancelled and, furthermore, withheld by BPS. Several reasons for the cancellation of 
KKB cards were found, including recipients who were assessed as unsuitable, duplicate 
cards, unknown recipients’ names and addresses or recipients who had changed 
address. 
 
In all sample kabupaten/kota, KKB cards that were cancelled as a result of the 
verification was only around 0.7% (see Table 4.8). The rate of cancellations was 
highest in Kota Ternate (13.1%) and lowest in Kabupaten Demak (0.3%). The high 
rate of KKB cancellations in Ternate is believed to be the result of a relatively better 
verification process that was done from door-to-door at the same time the KKB cards 
were distributed. 
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In four sample kabupaten/kota, all KKB cards that were received, aside from the 
cancelled cards, have been distributed to recipient households. In Kabupaten Bima 
especially, there were KKB cards that had not yet been distributed due to community 
demands, as was discussed above in the problem of the distribution of KKB cards. 
 
Table 4.8. Number of KKB Household Recipients and the Number of 
KKB Cards Cancelled in Sample Kabupaten/Kota 
KKB Cards Cancelled Sample 
Kabupaten/Kota 
Number of 
KKB 
Cards 
Received 
Number of 
KKB Cards 
Distributed 
Total % of Total 
Received 
1. Tapanuli Tengah 23,538  23,126 412 1.8 
2. Cianjur 179,939 178,798 1,141 0.6 
3. Demak 99,217 98,957 260 0.3 
4. Bima 43,641 42,414 171 0.4 
5. Ternate 3,932 3,416 516 13.1 
4.2.2. Funds Disbursement 
 
The first phase of the funding disbursement throughout Indonesia was divided into 
three distribution schedules. The first distribution for 15 strategic cities commenced on 
1 October 2005, the second disbursement for 24 provincial capitals and other strategic 
cities commenced on 5 October 2005, and the third distribution for other regions, 
commenced on 11 October 2005. Of the five sample kabupaten/kota, only Kota Ternate 
was included in the second disbursement regions, while others were in the third. In 
Ternate and Demak the disbursement took place in accordance with the schedule that 
had been determined. On the other hand, in Tapanuli Tengah this was delayed until 
13 October, and Cianjur until 22 October because the KKB cards arrived late. 
 
The funds disbursement to recipient households was conducted by the post office. The 
appointment of the post office as the manager of the SLT funding disbursement was 
considered appropriate by many parties. The post office is experienced in servicing 
community funds transfers. There are a relatively large number of post office branches 
widely dispersed to the kecamatan level. In addition, the possibility of funding leakages 
was relatively small because the community collected them directly and the post office 
was evaluated as relatively free of corruption. 
 
In all research locations, the post office has several branch offices. Nevertheless, as in 
many other regions as well, not all kecamatan in the sample kabupaten/kota have post 
office branches. In addition, the number of officials in each post office branch is also 
limited, with an average of only 1-2 people. Finally, the number of villages and SLT 
recipient households that have to be serviced by one post office branch is, on average, 
more than 20 villages with approximately 4,000 recipients (see Table 4.9). 
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Table 4.9. Number of Post Offices and Service Area Coverage in Sample 
Kabupaten/Kota 
Number of Post 
Offices Number of Villages Sample 
Kabupaten/Kota  
Inspector Branch 
Number of 
Kecamatan 
Total 
Average per 
Post Office 
Tapanuli Tengah - 6 15 160 27 
Cianjur 1 14 30 348 23 
Demak - 9 14 247 27 
Bima 1 9 14 150 15 
Ternate *) 1 3 4 63 16 
Note: *) In Kota Ternate, the post office branches did not provide the SLT disbursement that was 
centralized at the chief post office. 
The limited service area of these post offices forced some SLT recipients who live far 
from a post office to spend a significant amount of money on transport. In several 
districts, recipients had to spend Rp6,000-Rp15,000 on the cost of transport. These are 
quite significant amounts of money for poor families, especially if it is compared with 
the wages of farm laborers, a lot of whom are still earning below Rp15,000/person/day. 
Because transport money is not always available, many recipients were forced to go 
into debt or walk quite a long way to reach the closest post office. 
 
This condition was compounded by the tendency of recipients to collect their SLT 
payments on the first disbursement day, resulting in thousands of recipients attending 
simultaneously and crowding the payment offices. Apart from making it uncomfortable 
for recipients (both physically and psychologically), it also resulted in them losing a 
day’s work. On the other hand, this resulted in several facilities at the service locations 
being damaged, including broken windows and damaged chairs. 
 
The provision of the service for thousands of people in one working day also meant 
that it was easier for post office officials to make mistakes as the result of human error. 
Several post office officials, for example, forgot to remove the KKB coupon as proof of 
payment. A mistake for just one recipient will result in the official being responsible 
for Rp300,000. The post office officials were also unable to carefully check the original 
of the KKB card with the copy. 
 
The smoothness or otherwise of the disbursement of SLT funds was determined not 
only by the size of the district that had to be serviced, but also determined by the 
coordination and service planning with stakeholders prior to and during the funding 
disbursement. Several measures that were taken in several regions where the 
disbursement process worked smoothly were: 
 
1) The post office determined the disbursement schedule for each village by taking 
into consideration the number of SLT recipients that had to be served. 
 
2) The disbursement schedule was widely socialized to every village, and in fact, there 
were regions that attached it to the KKB card that was delivered to the recipients. 
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3) The post office coordinated with kecamatan and village officials and local police in 
controling the number and queueing of recipients.  
 
4) The post office added service posts and payment counters or was pro-active in 
relatively distant districts. 
 
In Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah and Cianjur, the disbursement of SLT funds ran 
smoothly and orderly and no commotions were heard of. In these two kabupaten, a 
schedule was prepared that was well-socialized. In Tapanuli Tengah, the disbursement 
schedule was enclosed when the KKB cards were delivered to recipients. In Cianjur the 
disbursement schedule was made known to village heads, via telephone or village 
postal officials. 
 
In Cianjur, apart from being conducted in the main and branch post offices, the 
service was also provided pro-actively at the village level in 12 kecamatan, especially in 
the South Cianjur area. In each kecamatan two to five service posts were provided. The 
funds disbursement schedule was, in general, determined for one day per village, and 
each cashier serviced 500-600 people, resulting in the service being completed in half a 
working day. In this region, the funds disbursement was quite well prepared and 
coordination with officials at the kecamatan level, the police, and village officials went 
smoothly. Village officials and the police were involved in organizing the recipient 
numbers and queuing. This was possible because Cianjur was among the last regions to 
distribute the SLT funds so there was enough time to learn from the implementation 
process in other regions. 
 
Although there were also efforts to enhance the service in other districts, this did not 
always work well because of other factors. In Kabupaten Demak and Bima, the local 
post office made a disbursement schedule for every village, however it was not well 
socialized. As a result, the community came simultaneously, resulting in long queues, 
shuffling, and a few disturbances such as torn or lost KKB cards. 
 
In Kota Ternate, the dissemination of the service was not effective because of the lack 
of coordination between the post office and BPS on which village’s KKB cards had 
already been distributed. In addition, the service in two villages was impeded because 
of the emergence of community conflict triggered by mistargeting concerns. It was 
finally decided that the funds disbursement will be undertaken by one main post office 
in each town. 
 
Up until the first phase of the funding disbursement was almost completed, the post 
office in the regions had not yet received clarification on who had full responsibility 
for the operational costs of the service. Some are of the opinion that the post office 
was responsible for the service costs, such as the installation of tents and the provisions 
for security officials. The post office hoped that there would be clear operational funds 
available, considering that many stakeholders are involved. 
 
In many areas, the unclear availability of operational funds was the reason for the 
absence of a mobile service or additional service posts that were more accessible for 
villages. As an example, the plan to open service posts on several islands located far 
from Kota Ternate has still not been undertaken and is still the subject of discussion 
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with local governments, especially concerning available funds. Meanwhile, it is rather 
difficult to expect recipients to travel to the post office in Kota Ternate because they 
have to pay transport costs of up to Rp200,000 per person. 
 
In several kecamatan in Kabupaten Bima, there were delays in the funds disbursement 
because of miscommunication between the local government and the post office. This 
delay caused material losses (transport and accommodation costs) that were significant 
for recipients who came to the kecamatan office which was appointed for the 
distribution of funds. 
 
On 7 October 2005, the Coordinating Minister for Peoples’ Welfare (Menko Kesra) 
stated that the government required identification in the form of a KTP or identity 
paper when the funds were disbursed. It appears this was not well publicized so the 
implementation of this varied between regions. Cianjur, Bima, and Tapanuli Tengah 
required proof of identity while other districts did not. Irrespective of whether there 
was a requirement or not, there should not have been any difficulty for adult villagers 
in fulfilling this requirement. In fact, it appears that there are still many recipients who 
do not have a KTP, because it is lost, burnt or they have never possessed one before. 
The post office gave a dispensation from this requirement and substituted it instead 
with a resident’s permit, identification statement or an application form for the 
production of a KTP signed by the relevant village authority. This stipulation, 
however, provided the impetus for certain parties, especially village officials, to 
demand production fees between Rp50,000 and Rp80,000. In the end, in Bima, the 
requirement for an accompanying form of identification was not enforced and, instead, 
several post offices required a village official to accompany the villagers during funds 
disbursement. 
 
The SLT funds, in general, were collected directly by those whose names were 
attached to the KKB card. A limited number were also deputed to a family member if 
the recipient was sick or aged. For the collections that were delegated, almost all 
districts required a power of attorney, proof of identity or a letter from a village official 
confirming that a person is a recipient. Aged or ill recipients who collected their own 
payments were usually given special priority so they did not need to queue. 
 
In South Tapanuli, the village head collected the funds for old-age recipients. This 
initiative was undertaken and agreed because this village is located on an island. There 
was a similar arrangement in Bima that developed into a local police case. This was 
because this village head unilaterally took Rp50,000 per recipient as a repayment for 
the collection. After this case was reported to police, the village head agreed to return 
the concerned funds to the recipients. 
 
Recipients obtained the SLT funds from the post office in the full amount of 
Rp300,000 without any deductions. Demands on some recipients to share their funds 
with other poor households who had not received SLT payments occurred at the 
community level. In Cianjur, through the coordination of the RT heads, the SLT 
recipients on average contributed Rp50,000. In Demak, as the result of the pressure 
from other poor people, recipients in the two sample RT gave Rp25,000 to Rp100,000. 
Meanwhile, in Tapanuli Tengah at the suggestion of adat figures, recipients gave an 
average of Rp50,000 that will be returned during the second disbursement phase, if 
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households that are given money become additional recipients. In Cianjur, some 
recipients also voluntarily provided money to enumerators and local RT heads of 
around Rp3,000 – Rp10,000. 
 
In general, SLT recipients admitted that quarterly disbursements are appropriate, as 
monthly disbursements are too small and require a larger cost for transport. The near 
poor more often wanted the disbursement all at once because the funds could be used 
as additional business capital. 
 
4.2.3. Funding Utilization  
 
In all research sites, almost all recipients used the SLT funds immediately after 
receiving them. In total, only 4.5% of recipients admitted to still having some of the 
funds. In general, the recipients used the funds for a variety of needs. Of 89 recipient 
household respondents whose funding use could be identified, 90% used the funds for 
consumption needs. At the kabupaten/kota level, the use of the SLT funds for 
consumption was most dominant, and in Cianjur and Demak it was the case for all 
recipients. Rice was the consumption item most often purchased because, apart from 
being the staple foodstuff, it could also be stored for a relatively long time. 
 
Around 23.6% of recipients used these funds to pay off debts with neighbors, stall 
owners or other parties who provided loans to cover daily consumption needs. Because 
the disbursement of SLT funds was undertaken in the lead-up to Lebaran, there were 
also recipients (22.5%) who used their funds to buy clothes for Lebaran. This was most 
commonly the case for the SLT recipients in Cianjur. 
 
Meanwhile, the number of households that utilized the funds for school fees or the cost 
of medical treatment was relatively small, a total of 14.6% and 11.2% respectively. 
Nevertheless, the availability of the funds in relation to the costs of treatment was 
considered to be very helpful, because at the time the SLT funds were received, several 
respondents were sick or unable to afford the cost of treatment, with the exception of 
Bima where not a single person used the SLT funds for that purpose. 
Table 4.10. Usage of SLT Funds by Household Recipients (by Percentage) 
Type of Use Tapanuli 
Tengah 
Cianjur Demak Bima Ternate Total 
Clothing 22.2 42.1 17.6 6.7 20.0 22.5
Food  72.2 100.0 100.0 93.3 85.0 89.9
School fees 27.8 10.5 5.9 13.3 15.0 14.6
Medical fees 22.2 5.3 17.6 0.0 10.0 11.2
Paying Debts 11.1 52.6 17.6 40.0 0.0 23.6
Business capital 5.6 21.1 0.0 33.3 30.0 18.0
House improvements 11.1 5.3 0.0 0.0 15.0 6.7
Others 16.7 52.6 0.0 26.7 30.0 25.8
Number of 
Respondents 18 19 17 15 20 89
Note: One recipient household can use SLT funds for one or more purposes. 
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Recipient respondents who used the SLT funds for business capital totaled only 18%, 
and in Demak there were, in fact, none. In Bima and Ternate, however, almost one-
third of recipients used their payments for business capital. Because the amount of 
money received was relatively small, the funds were, in general, only used as additional 
business capital, such as to buy agricultural fertilizer and seeds, adding trading stock or 
adding business capital for a small business. Many respondents admit that this amount 
of money was not enough to open a new business. 
 
4.3. Socialization 
 
The problem of weak socialization of the SLT program was experienced in almost all 
regions and at all stages of the implementation, starting with the data collection 
process, the funding disbursement through to the complaints mechanism. The local 
governments at all levels as well as the broad community admit to not obtaining 
adequate information on the SLT program. In fact, it could be said that the 
community socialization was not conducted. The socialization was only provided to 
recipient households when the KKB cards were distributed, but it was limited to 
information concerning the venue and schedule for the collection of funds. 
 
The community, in general, knew about the SLT program after the distribution of the 
KKB cards or the disbursement of the funds. They obtained the information by word of 
mouth, and some groups obtained the information from the media (television, radio, 
and newspapers). 
 
The program socialization for local government officials was provided by BPS through 
a coordination meeting at the kabupaten/kota level where various agencies, sub-district 
heads (camat) and village heads were invited. This socialization, however, only 
informed local officials about the data collection plan for poor households. It was 
found that preceding the funding disbursement, the coordination meeting in some 
districts gave information on the KKB card distribution plan. Meanwhile, the in-depth 
socialization on the SLT was conducted internally for BPS officials and provided 
technical information. 
 
No institutions, at the kabupaten/kota down to village level felt responsible for 
conducting the socialization activity. Local governments felt that there was no clear 
directive on this issue, and they also never received clear information on the SLT 
program. Meanwhile, BPS only felt responsible for the data collection matters. 
 
The institution that was responsible for conducting the SLT socialization was actually the 
Menkominfo (The Ministry of Communication and Information). The socialization 
undertaken by Menkominfo was, however, limited only through the print and electronic 
media and SMS services, while broad community access to these forms of media is still 
limited. Meanwhile, the socialization by distribution of brochures on the criteria for poor 
households that was issued by Menkominfo, apart from arriving late (21 November 2005) 
and in limited numbers, was also less than informative for the general community. 
 
After the funds disbursement, especially after many complaints or the emergence of 
community disturbances, almost all local governments conducted a socialization program 
for officials as well as the community in the affected district. The socialization for 
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officials was undertaken in the context of information regarding re-registration, while for 
the community in order to quell conflict. In Cianjur, for example, there was a 
dissemination of information on the 14 variables for eligible families (see the Appendix 
10: Sosialization material of the village of Cugenang in Cianjur) that was delivered 
through the activities of the village government or routine religious activities. 
 
The weak socialization of the program was worsened by the unavailability of 
comprehensive operating procedures for the program at the government level from 
kabupaten/kota to village. At the same time, partial guidelines in the form of a book of 
implementation guidelines for the household data collection and guidelines for the 
distribution of KKB cards that was issued by BPS and aimed at local government 
officials was also not properly distributed. In addition, several SLT-related documents 
from the central government that could actually provide the legal basis for local 
governments, such as Inpres, decrees from the Coordinating Minister of Peoples’ 
Welfare (Menko Kesra) and the Minister of Home Affairs, were late in arriving or, in 
fact, were not received. 
 
Not only was the socialization of the program weak but also the socialization of the 
name of the program itself. The program has different designations, namely the Direct 
Cash Transfer (Subsidi Langsung Tunai: SLT) or Cash Transfer Assistance (Bantuan 
Langsung Tunai: BLT). This was due to the difference in designation at the central 
government level which was set out in several policies that provided the basis for the 
program. Inpres No. 12 of 2005 referred to it as BLT, while several ministerial 
documents and operational guidelines refer to it as SLT. This certainly caused 
confusion for various parties. Nevertheless, at the community level this program was 
better known as BBM Compensation. 
 
On one hand, the minimal level of socialization in the data collection phase can 
reduce moral hazard in target determination. On the other hand, however, the lack of 
a comprehensive socialization of the program gave rise to misperceptions and social 
jealousies. 
 
4.4. Complaints and Problem Resolution 
 
The occurence of mistargeting, although small, that was worsened by the inadequacy 
of the program socialization, especially in regard to the target criteria and program 
objectives, has triggered community dissatisfaction. Community dissatisfaction was 
expressed in various forms starting with complaints, protests or demonstrations, 
making threats against officials to destruction of tools. In Cianjur, the community took 
protest action by going to the houses of the RT head and enumerators, as well as the 
village office. There were also cases of the destruction of the houses of the village and 
hamlet heads. In Demak, protest actions were made in one kecamatan office by 
mobilizing the community in three trucks. In Bima, the village office was sealed off for 
two days. In Tapanuli Tengah, protest action in one village caused the delay in the 
distribution of KKB cards on three occasions. 
 
In addition, the past conflict such as that occurred in Bima and Tapanuli Tengah 
worsened the conflict. The post-reformasi condition following the implementation of 
village and regional autonomy, resulted in the village community being unafraid in 
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putting forth their opinions, which occasionally took the form of protest actions. It was 
strongly assumed that the scale of the protest action was more of a result of local 
politics rather than technical problems related to the implementation of the SLT 
program. In Tapanuli Tengah, apart from the history of conflict in the past 
nomination of the village head, the plan for regional head election to be held on 11 
December 2005 also increased the potential for conflict in the community. 
 
In several areas, the damage to the socio-political order of the local community was 
considered bigger than the advantage that was received by the poor through the SLT 
Program. In the sample villages where the implementation of the SLT was assessed as 
good, community protests were still occuring although they could then be 
appropriately resolved. 
 
In the resolution of problems that emerged in the community, the village head had an 
important role. Quite a few, however, involved the security apparatus such as the 
police or local military post in the kecamatan. Good coordination between BPS and 
local government also provided satisfactory results in reducing conflict in several 
regions. The means of conflict resolution varied, including:  
 
1) Giving a direct explanation to the community of the criteria for SLT recipient 
households. BPS accompanied by Asda (Assistant Regional Secretary), camat and 
village heads visited villagers to explain the SLT program. The initiative of one 
RT in this village to ask BPS to explain the criteria for SLT recipients proved 
helpful in mitigating conflict that occurred. 
2) The willingness of SLT recipients to share some of the funds they received with 
other poor households. In several RT in Demak, SLT recipients set aside between 
Rp25,000-Rp100,000, while in Cianjur an average of Rp50,000 was set aside. In 
Tapanuli Tengah, adat leaders consensually requested recipients to set aside 
Rp50,000, but these funds were considered loans that would be returned if these 
households obtained supplementary SLT payments in the second phase. 
3) The opening of a supplementary registration for households who felt entitled. In 
practice, the registration was not only undertaken directly by the relevant 
household. There were households that didn’t register but were registered by the 
RT head, enumerator, neighbor or village head. The registered unit was also not 
always the household as there were also individuals or families. As a consequence 
there was high increase in the number of supplementary registrations, as was 
covered in the previous section on targeting. 
4) There were officials who promised that supplementary registrants would recieve 
the SLT in the next phase. This promise, although in the short-term was able to 
reduce conflict, in the long-term there is a concern that it could, in fact, give rise 
to new and broader problems. 
To anticipate complaints and at the same time to monitor the program 
implementation, the government issued the Minister of Home Affairs Directive No. 
541/2475/SJ and the Coordinating Minister for Peoples’ Welfare Directive No. 
B.244/Menko/Kesra/IX/2005 that requested regional governments to establish a 
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coordinating post (posko) for complaints and monitoring, the funding allocation of 
which was added to the APBD.9 In its implementation, the SLT posko was only found 
in Demak and Ternate, and it was only limited at the kabupaten/kota level. The 
existence of posko and the available complaints mechanism was also not broadly 
disseminated to the community, so there were variations in the complaints channels. 
 
For the SLT Monitoring and Complaints Posko in Demak, the regional government 
appointed the Community Empowerment Office (Kantor Pemberdayaan Masyarakat: 
Kapermas) as the coordinator of the PKPS BBM (Compensation Program for Reduced 
Subsidies on Refined Fuel Oil) complaints post, including the SLT program. In its 
implementation, the posko only accepted complaints in the form of the submission of 
suggestions for new SLT recipients. The submission mechanism also did not involve 
Kapermas directly, because the suggestions of new targets were, in general, submitted 
directly to the BPS office, and Kapermas was only given a copy as the report. 
 
In Ternate, the PKPS BBM Monitoring and Complaints Team was formed on 1 
October 2005. The team was better known as the Complaints and Monitoring Posko, 
headed by the Sekda of Kota Ternate whose membership consisted of the head or 
section head of various agencies, including the post office and BPS. This Posko was 
only formed at the kota level, while there were none at the village and kecamatan level. 
Although poskos were formed, the socialization on the existence of the posko was only 
conducted at the village level so the utilization of the posko by the community was not 
maximized. Many community complaints were sent directly to BPS with or without a 
copy to the posko.  
 
Meanwhile, although the Tapanuli Tengah district had a PKPS BBM Monitoring and 
Community Complaints Coordination Team that covered nine programs, the SLT 
program was not included. So, if the community was not satisfied with the SLT 
program, they went directly to the village head, lorong head, enumerator or BPS. 
 
Like Tapanuli Tengah, in Cianjur the complaints posko at the level of the kabupaten, 
kecamatan, and village was the complaints post for the BBM compensation program 
that was given the name Community Complaints Unit (Unit Pengaduan Masyarakat: 
UPM). Because there was no clear complaints mechanism, the community members 
who felt dissatisfied with the SLT program complained to the RT, RW or hamlet head, 
village head or officials, enumerators, KSK or BPS. Meanwhile, the complaints in the 
BIMA district, both oral and written, were distributed to various agencies, including 
BPS, post office, police, Bappeda, and DPRD.  
 
To anticipate the emergence and spread of community discord, during the BPS 
national technical meeting, the participation of the police in providing security was 
stressed again, including protecting authorities and applying sanctions to offending 
officials and people. In West Java and Central Java, the local police published a 
circular that contained provisions on the criminal sanctions for those making false 
documents or papers on poor households. 
 
                                                 
9Directive of the Minister for Home Affairs number 541/2338/SJ, dated 13 September 2005 on the 
Preparation of Operational Costs and Monitoring of the Implementation of PKPS-BBM in the APBD. 
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4.5. Institutional Issues 
 
The weakness of coordination and communication in the implementation of the SLT 
program was the main problem faced by officials at the kabupaten/kota level. This can 
be seen, among other reasons, by the fact that various official documents on the SLT 
operation issued by the central government was late in arriving, or even not received 
by kabupaten/kota governments. 
 
Inpres No. 12 of 2005 on the Implementation of the SLT for Poor Households that was 
issued on 10 September 2005 provided the first legal basis for the SLT program. Via 
this Inpres, the president, inter alia, instructed Bappenas to coordinate the planning 
preparation and the organizations implementing the program. The president also 
instructed governors, district heads, and mayors along with their officials to provide 
support and supervision for the program implementation. In the meantime, the data 
collection activity on poor households had already been started one month earlier by 
BPS (on 15 August 2005).10  
 
In practice, the Inpres document and other documents on the SLT program were only 
received by local governments when the SLT funds were beng disbursed to recipients. 
Local government, therefore, felt that they were not being involved officially in the 
SLT program from early on. The data collection by BPS on poor families/households, 
according to many regional officials, was conducted without coordination with local 
government. This might have been caused by BPS officials’ perception that data 
collection was just a routine activity. This process created the impression in the 
regions that the SLT program was centralized and implemented by institutions that 
were also centralized (BPS and PT Pos Indonesia). On one hand, local government 
supported the central government effort to reduce poverty in their region. On the 
other hand, local government questioned the central government’s commitment to the 
implementation of political decentralization and regional autonomy. 
 
The organizing of the data collection and determination of poor families/households by 
BPS as a central agency that tended to lack transparency added to the impression of 
centralization in the management of the SLT program. This non-transparent process 
was also considered to be in contradiction with the democratization process which was 
being developed. In this regard, there was indeed conflict between the law that 
prevents BPS from publicizing respondents’ identities (Law No. 16 of 1997) with the 
democratic need to consult on the proposed SLT recipients with the local public. 
 
In addition, inaccuracy in interpreting Inpres No. 12 of 2005 during the conduct of the 
coordinating meeting at the ministerial level in the Peoples’ Welfare portfolio (16 
September 2005) also impacted on the optimization of the role of the Ministry for 
Home Affairs. The duty of the Ministry for Home Affairs as implementation and 
supervision coordinator was interpreted as being supervision and handling of 
complaints. For that reason, one function of local government as the instrument of the 
                                                 
10The Minister for Home Affairs (Mendagri) communicated this activity via document No. 
413.3/1941/SJ dated 1 August 2005 on the Data Collection on the Poor that, inter alia, stated: “... we 
request all governors, district heads and mayors to prepare all village heads, RW heads and RT heads as 
nominee field officials who will assist BPS to conduct this data collection exercise.” 
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Ministry for Home Affairs to coordinate the implementation of the SLT program was 
not undertaken. 
 
Thus, when the results of the poor family/household data collection gave rise to socio-
political unrest in various regions, the central government then seriously requested 
local governments to take “security” steps. Two documents that were issued by the 
central government, namely: 1) the decree of the Minister for Home Affairs No. 
541/2475/SJ dated 26 September 2005 concerning the Technical Guidelines for the 
Administration of Community Complaint Resolution and Monitoring the SLT for 
Poor Families for 2005, and 2) the decree of the Coordinating Minister for Peoples’ 
Welfare No. B.244/Menko/Kesra/IX/2005 dated 28 September 2005 on the 
Establishment of Complaints Posts. The Directive of the Coordinating Minister for 
Peoples’ Welfare, requested, inter alia, that governors, district heads, mayors, sub-
district heads and village heads, within two days, establish a community complaint 
post in their respective regions.11 Therefore, the local governments were positioned as 
trouble-shooters. 
 
Nevertheless, the SLT recipient community liked the simplicity of the SLT program 
management bureaucracy, which was assigned to BPS and the post office and was the 
sole key to the efficiency of the program administration. The problems that then often 
arose were due to the fact that these two agencies’ employees are used to working 
within a technical paradigm. Meanwhile, poverty is a multidimensional problem and 
requires a comprehensive social, economic and political approach. 
 
4.6. Level of Satisfaction and Program Output 
 
4.6.1. Level of Satisfaction 
 
To understand the extent of the level of satisfaction of stakeholders with the SLT 
program, focus group discusssions (FGD) were undertaken with community groups that 
represented SLT recipients and village and kabupaten/kota officials and leaders. The 
aspects that were observed included determination and accuracy of targeting, 
socialization, card distribution, funds disbursement, problem handling and institutional 
issues. Approximately 6-10 FGD participants from each group were asked their 
opinions about these aspects by using a score between 10-100. The higher the score 
they gave, the higher the level of satisfaction. The results of this FGD are presented in 
Diagram 1. 
 
In general, the level of satisfaction of the SLT recipient community was higher than 
the level of satisfaction of village and kabupaten/kota leaders and officials. This is 
understandable because it is the recipients who benefit most from the SLT program. 
                                                 
11Based on these documents, various regions then formed community complaints posts. The governor of 
DKI Jakarta, for example, issued a Governor’s Decision No. 1913/2005 dated 4 October 2005 on the 
Formation of Community Complaints Unit and PKPS BBM Monitoring Unit Teams; the mayor of  
Ternate issued a Ternate Mayor’s Decision No. 167/8/Kota-Tte/2005 dated 1 October 2005 on the 
Formation of Community Complaints Team and Monitoring of the BBM subsidy reduction 
compensation; and the Camat of Monta, Kabupaten Bima issued Decree No. 10 of 2005 dated 26 
October on the Formation of the Monitoring, Evaluation, and Supervision Team on Data Collection 
Distribution, and Disbursement of BBM Compensation Assistance Funds.  
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Meanwhile, the level of satisfaction of village leaders and officials was the lowest. This 
is understandable because they were the ones who most negatively affected by 
problems in the administration of the SLT program. 
 
In the view of SLT recipients, the factor that was felt to be most unsatisfactory was the 
lack of socialization, especially information on the criteria for recipient households. 
The complaint handling issue was also considered still unsatisfactory. Meanwhile, the 
issue of targeting accuracy or determination was assessed as good and quite satisfactory. 
It was also the same with the distribution of cards, funds disbursement, and the amount 
of the SLT funds. 
Diagram 1: Level of Satisfaction with the Implementation of the SLT Program 
Village/District Authorities & Officials   SLT Recipients 
 
 
On the other hand, the level of satisfaction of village authorities/officials tended to be 
lower than the level of satisfaction of those at the kabupaten/kota level, with the 
exception of the distribution of KKB cards. These two groups considered the KKB 
distribution and funds disbursement as the most satisfying aspects. The socialization 
program and institutionalization were considered most unsatisfactory. 
 
This study also tried to uncover the same information from non-recipient households 
through in-depth interviews. In general, non-recipient respondents’ level of 
satisfaction was not that much different from the SLT recipients. They were of the 
opinion that the socialization was the weakest, while the determination process and 
targeting accuracy, and problem handling was considered to be quite good. 
Nevertheless, they also viewed that there were a small number of poor households like 
themselves that did not receive the SLT. On the other hand, there were also a few 
recipient households that they considered unsuitable. 
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4.6.2. Impact of the Program 
 
There were glaring differences of opinion between government officials, SLT recipient 
households and the community in general on the impact of the SLT. 
 
Community officials/leaders 
 
Community leaders and officials, in general, were in less agreement with this program 
because they considered it to be a “program that only provided fish rather than a fish-hook”. 
They were concerned that this assistance would make the community become 
indolent. This program was also considered counter-productive to other programs that 
were more in the nature of community empowerment. They suggested this program 
not be provided over the long-term, but that a one-year program was sufficent. In the 
future, the program should not create the impression that it is “giving out money for 
free” or “handing out money”, but rather these programs should be in the form of 
community empowerment programs, infrastructure development or those that provide 
employment opportunities. 
 
There were also community officials and leaders who viewed that this program would 
be very good if it was accurately targeted. Through this program, the poor could be 
assisted in covering their daily needs that are becoming increasingly expensive. 
 
SLT program recipients 
 
SLT recipients were very grateful for the SLT program because the funds they received 
could be utilized in accordance with their needs. This was especially so when the 
disbursement coincided with Ramadan when there are usually a lot of additional costs 
to be met. They considered that the program did not have an impact on their work 
ethic in fulfilling basic family needs. They admitted that this amount of money could 
not be used for new business capital, but only to fulfill consumption needs, children’s 
school fees, medical treatment, and additional business capital.  
 
One SLT recipient said that: “This is the first time since the Dutch and Japanese colonial 
period that the government has provided direct monetary assistance to its people.” One other 
person said that: “This is the only program where the poor can fully enjoy the benefit because 
in other programs, the village elites and officials always intervened.” 
 
Some recipients objected to the suggestion to replace the SLT program with intensive 
work programs. They saw that intensive work programs reduced the possibility of the 
aged or disabled poor from becoming recipients. In addition, it would be difficult for 
fishers and farmers to join this program. 
 
The positive impact of this program was an enhanced awareness of possessing a KTP, 
although as a result of compulsion. This is because in some regions, the collection of 
the SLT funds required accompanying forms of proof, such as KTP or identification 
papers from the village head. 
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Village officials 
 
Almost all village officials said that they were negatively affected by the SLT program. 
The RT heads or lorong/hamlet heads felt that they were not appreciated by residents 
who did not receive the SLT because these families felt that their condition was 
ignored. In several villages, it became increasingly difficult to request residents to 
engage in mutual assistance activities and the reception of village tax levies was 
affected. 
 
In addition, the various threats made against village and data collection officials 
created strain among many village officials and data collectors. Some of them resigned 
from their positions. In fact, all village heads in Kecamatan Cibeber, Cianjur, planned 
to resign if the supplementary SLT recipients were not approved because they were 
concerned for their safety. 
 
General community 
 
Social jealousies appeared in the community. The community became reluctant to pay 
their zakat (community tithe) and their pancen (levy for paying the wages of village 
officials) and Building and Land Tax (PBB). It was considered that the SLT program 
could cause dependency and moral hazard because the community would always expect 
to be given assistance. This concern is supported by the number of people who applied 
for the second phase of the data collection, although many of them were actually 
relatively well-off. 
 
The presence of this program encourged other groups working on similiar program, 
such as the Regional Poverty Reduction Committee (Komite Penanggulangan 
Kemiskinan Daerah: KPKD) and NGOs to enhance cooperation and exchange 
information on poverty data in the region. 
 
4.6.3. Monitoring Program 
 
In the five research locations, there did not appear to be any comprehensive 
monitoring activity. Monitoring activity was only partial in nature, connected with 
the interests of each implementing agency, namely BPS and the post office. 
 
The monitoring initiative by local government began to be undertaken in some 
districts. It was aimed more at observing conflict that arose and planning efforts to 
overcome it. In one kecamatan in Cianjur, for example, the camat had distributed forms 
to collect information about the development of the SLT program and the problems 
that arose. 
 
At the national level, for monitoring purposes, the office of the Coordinating Minister 
for Peoples’ Welfare in cooperation with a number of university research institutions 
conducted research on the SLT program at the kabupaten/kota level. This activity was 
undertaken almost simultaneously with the conduct of this study. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
1. BPS and the post office should continue as the main SLT managers in the field. It 
is suggested that these two institutions, in addition to being responsible to their 
superior agencies, also be responsible to the bupati/mayor in each of their working 
area or report their activities to the bupati/mayor.  
 
2. The Ministry of Home Affairs needs to assign kabupaten/kota governments to 
coordinate all implementation and supervision activities for the SLT in 
accordance with Inpres No.12 of 2005. In undertaking this duty, the local 
government should immediately establish an integrated posko at all levels of 
government (kabupaten/kota, kecamatan, and village) that involves BPS, the post 
office and the police.  
 
3. The duty of local government to be implemented within the framework of the 
routine activities of regional government administration. The operational costs of 
implementation is to be borne by the APBD, particularly for poor regions it is to 
be provided via special allocation funds (DAK). 
 
4. It should be clear whether the concept of poor family or poor household will be 
used. At the least, in the same district, a uniform concept should be used.  
 
5. KKB cards for households that are not suitable recipients have to be immediately 
cancelled by the posko. For households that refuse cancellation, their funds can be 
blocked at the post office.  
 
6. Cancelled KKB cards should be immediately delivered to the kabupaten/kota BPS 
and the post office informed in order to avoid funding misuse or disbursement by 
people who have no entitlement. 
 
7. The posko should immediately undertake verification and research of 
supplementary household recipients. The verification and research should be done 
from house to house. If there is insufficient time, this can be done via a community 
consultation (musyawarah) at the village level. 
 
8. The distribution of KKB cards to supplementary household recipients by the posko 
has to be in accordance with the KKB distribution guidelines from BPS. 
 
9. The names of SLT household recipients, including the results of the 
supplementary data collection, need to be published in public places at the SLS 
level. To validate the accuracy of targeting, the community should be given the 
opportunity to submit their objections to the closest posko within a certain 
timeframe. 
 
10. To improve the system of coordination and communication, the central 
government has to ensure that all documents that it issues are received by each 
kabupaten/kota government administration. 
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11. The central government has to support the implementation of program 
socialization for the community using various channels, namely regional 
government, various print and electronic media and the wide-scale distribution of 
more informative and communicative brochures. The socialization material should 
especially emphasize the program aims, criteria for program recipients, and the 
availability and function of coordinating posts.  
 
12. The post office needs to prepare a complete and clear SLT funds distribution 
schedule for each village. Information on the place and schedule for distribution 
should be publicized to recipients through various means, for example through 
village officials or announcements in places of religious worship. 
 
13. The post office needs to be flexible in distributing the funds, for example by 
providing mobile posts or opening service posts at the village level. 
 
14. Consideration needs to be given to introducing a requirement for identification 
such as a KTP when funds are disbursed. This is to minimize funding digressions 
such as: the collection of funds by those with no entitlement or the buying and 
selling of KKB cards. This needs to be supported by a policy on the production of 
identity cards (KTP) that is easy, cheap or free.  
 
15. There needs to be clear law enforcement for every form of program violation, such 
as the falsification of information and levies on recipients. The issuing of sanctions 
and their dissemination will have the effect of dissuading the community and 
other authorities from commiting such violations. 
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